On healthcare progress and social unification
Purpose of the essay:
Technical readership level: Medium to High.
The reason for drawing specific attention to the metacognitive human concept of “Social Unification” in this Dot theory-inspired essay, is that both positive and negative impact on social unification are known, contextually bound, and somewhat predictable byproducts of increased human organisation and rationalisation (Weber and Durkheim). As such, this essay will argue (and if Dot theory were to be elevated to accepted theory), it could be wise to consider at the earliest opportunity, the potential navigation of social reform so as to minimise the negative impact and optimise for the positive.
This potential for an intelligent and commercially valuable good, together with the product cost of regionally associated and optimised social and healthcare policies, political trends and socio-demographic migrations, are each of cost and importance to the optimisation of the social and individual human notions of wellbeing and population control (Social Unity measures). This essay presupposes that as a paradigm-shifting organisation- and rationalisation-optimisation process that can applied to any theory, Dot theory would as such logically be expected to have an impact on Social Unification, and that if that impact can be rationalised, then that intelligence can be used to benefit the more-optimal navigation of regional rationalisation and organisation as well as improve management of their impact on human wellbeing, energy and environment.
abstract
Historically, the impact of a theory on social unification has been evaluated after the fact, but it stands to reason that any theory on reality that produces increased rationalisation, like Dot theory does if correct, is likely to impact social unification by its influence on the social and individual experience of life. Evaluating this potential effect preemptively may seem hasty, but on careful analysis, doing so also appears as fertile ground for the efficient development and distribution of human welfare applications and services. This essay evaluates and proposes a framework for this fertile ground while focusing on systemic healthcare innovation inequality.
As a theory on reality, Dot Theory produces many benefits but, and for the purposes of this essay, it also invites change on all scales. One of those scales is Social Unity, and the starting position of this essay is that Dot Theory, if correct, will have an impact on social unity. This is the known impact of theories of reality, and like its predecessors, it will form a social unity of a different kind. Awaiting confirmation of the theory’s accuracy, one can in the meanwhile tangentially consider that creating or being associated with change of any type comes with personal and social responsibility. This essay aims to both seriously consider this responsibility and invite early consideration of Dot Theory’s impact from other perspectives. It does not propose fixed solutions or products but routes of inquiry for the development of intelligent and cost-effective applications for human benefit.
Key words: Information theory, mimetics, innovation, healthcare, social modelling
Introduction:
The considered debate on the social impact of innovation and progress in healthcare is laden with multiple group and individual social-value streams and made opaque by the contextualised way we each evaluate its impact on social unity. Ranging from health-inequality to frontier medicine, these streams come with their unique ethical and cultural contexts, pressures and risks. The questions as to what “social unification” really means then, and how it is held in the current cultural context, are placed centrally in this essay. For clarity: this essay doesn’t aim to provide solutions, but merely debate the point for consideration and implementation. As a start, I could state that innovation, however it comes to be, and whichever its cost distribution, inevitably creates social distinction, if only in access. It then naturally follows that it is not innovation itself that causes inequality but that inequality is an inevitable, even if temporary, consequence of how societies structure innovation, distribution, and policies. It is symptomatic of the user, so to speak. With the time to consider the impact of rationalisation on social unification, I believe debates like this can help us to guide equitable healthcare design, then optimise manufacture and distribution for efficiency.
Innovation, progress and social unity
As entirely rejecting innovation is ultimately absurd, the more constructive discussion focuses on the regulation of public access to healthcare innovation in a bid to minimise obstacles to social permeation. As such, we can open by recognising that during this pre-unification phase, those with access to innovation have access to something new. Something they may benefit from testing, yet only have conditional need for. In this process both wins and losses are accrued by both those with, and without access. In healthcare this is quantified as suffering and cost. This will however, inevitably and temporarily, create a perspective-bound sense of inequality. If accepted as logically inevitable to the process of unification, this pre-integration phase can be recognised as a process that results in the optimised cost- and reliability-structure changes required for integration. This process can be more or less efficient and its relative efficiency is contextual, can be measured and calculated.
This inevitable phase of temporary inequality should then perhaps better be modelled into a method to anticipate and positively improve the baseline by minimising waste. In this context, the idea of unification can be thought of as the moment where permeation of access to successful strategies is no longer a distinguishable feature. This unity we’d be more systematically pursuing then, would most accurately be defined as the “absence of notable differences”. This then raises the important issue of the observer, their measurement tools and their willingness to observe and report these differences of course. This also connects it to Dot theory’s fundamental notions of the unique individual, computable representations of consciousness as a self-generated holographic simulations discussed in other essays on this site.
What are innovation and progress?
There appears to be a clear distinction between innovation and progress, in that one is legally attributable while the other is the product of an ethereal collaboration. What they both share however is the novelty element of having done something and achieved a, relatively speaking, better outcome in some respect. Even if having changed something not systemically repeatable, like time, partners or events. What “better” means in this context again becomes a matter of perspective, and is beyond the scope of this essay but suffice to say that progress and innovation, in this essay are used interchangeably. This because whether it is one or the other is defined only by notions of legal ownership and benefit rights associated to the work done. It is what makes those rights fair that distinguishes one from the other, not their effect, nature or construct in any other way. In this sense, one could speak of innovation when it is capitalisable for profit, and progress when it just happens.
What does “social” mean?
The definitions of identity, both private, social and professional continuously evolve under each other’s socially sanctioned influence. In the context of this essay, "social" refers to the dynamic, relational fabric of human interactions, identities, and structures that emerge from collective meaning-making. These are often shaped by imitation, power dynamics, and shared narratives, echoing theories that state that desires and behaviours are not innate but copied from models, leading to polar notions of rivalry or cohesion. Social, then, is not a static category but a process and a dynamic interplay of individuals within systems where sentiments assign value to data/experiences, creating hierarchies or equalities.
For healthcare progress, "social" highlights how innovation intersects with these relations: e.g., frontier medicine might unify elites through shared access but fragment broader society if distribution favors the privileged. If Dot Theory is correct, it reframes "social" as computable and when bias-corrected, reveals inefficiencies in social structures. This could preempt inequality by modeling how health advancements permeate cultures, turning "social" from a vague descriptor into a predictive variable for useful for optimised social unification.
What Does "Unification" Mean?
"Unification" in this essay implies the convergence of disparate social elements into a metacognitive cohesive whole, where differences (e.g., in access, outcomes, or identities) become unnotable, indistinguishable or harmonised through rationalisation and integration. It's not mere homogeneity but the absence of notability to the existing variation. This is not to say physical homogeneity or lack of aesthetic and material variation, but rather the absence of pre-integrationphase-defining friction as it resolves into equitable permeation. Drawing from systems theory; unification then is like entropy in Quantum information structures: fragmented "dots" (sentiments, data) reorganised into fractal but stable, efficient patterns, reducing waste and conflict.
In healthcare, unification isn't only inevitable from progress alone, it can also be a designed outcome by the way its innovation development and delivery mechanisms are distributed. Novelty creates temporary inequality as early adopters test and refine, accruing both "wins and losses" (suffering, in health terms). Dot Theory, if accurate, could accelerate the permeation and reduce inequality by linearising the process and predicting sentiment-driven diffusion to minimise the pre-integration phase's duration and costs. Ethically, this invites responsibility: pursuing unification as "the absence of notable differences" demands observers (us) to measure and report equitably, and accept that biases obscure true progress.
These definitions position Dot Theory and its tentatively defined framework as a tool for proactive unification, turning healthcare innovation from a divider into a motivated cultural integrator.
So, what if we let the Dot AI take over?
In a world awash with debate on AI’s global takeover, it is perhaps not so much a question of a of takeover as it is of a specific type of AI’s placement within our reality. In other words: it is which service the AI provides for the human user that connects it further or closer to notions of individual reality and human consciousness. With the framework defined so far in this essay, the user of Dot theory products, will minimise the experience of notable differences (reduce injury and sickness events), but further down the line, and with AI seamlessly integrated into daily life, do we, as humans choose to avoid suffering too systemically and become weak?
Logic dictates that this does not apply in Dot’s AI healthcare products (its mathematical and algorithmic frameworks) for one simple reason, if the individual user ignores the enhanced advice offered by its Dot-AI, the individual will have chosen so (free will) and likely go through their natural healing cycle, stay the same, or worsen at which point they may reconsider. If they follow it, they will likely heal more quickly and efficiently (reduce suffering). Either way, this can inform the Dot AI of its tracking accuracy of previous suggestions, and helps other users, but does not alter its output unless the individual’s circumstances change, or the AI’s output changes due to lessons learned. In essence, this system would know what you need like a mother, tell you like a kind grandparent, and not mind if you ignored it. The route to ASI of AGI is not a takeover, it’s just a process of symbiotically enriching our available choices and progress in the places where it is ethical to do so. Whether we make them, is a matter of individual choice and free will.
Secondly, the controllable elements of developing individual robustness and weakness (Healthcare) are fundamentally a matter of the individual’s free will, chosen to be expressed within the context of their reality. This free will exists within the spectrum of “choices known over choices available” and it is the distribution of the choices available that gives rise to innovation inequality. My position is that AI cannot ethically and legally tell us prospectively what will be “right or wrong”, it can only tell us what would better for us individually and within our context, and offer physicians and patients additional choices. This requires a cultural and linguistic adaptation within the broader healthcare culture, but seems eminently feasible. We know health requires robustness and that robustness requires both energy, challenge and rest on circumstance-appropriate terms. This is known data within the context of healing and epidemiology. Simultaneously, challenge and rest are physiologically measurable, knowable and correlable. As such, a Dot-AI product that is motivated with the knowledge on behaviours and therapies to achieve the physiological states that correlate to prospective robustness, can only refine for choices and improve within that knowledge.
Finally, much discussion is had on motivation (teleology) and consciousness in Super-AI. In Dot theory-based AI products, the syntax and inbuilt motivation of the AI’s LLM is to identify the most accurate set of predictions available. In this Dot-theory algorithmic formulation, the purpose and product of the LLM’s mathematics itself is the motive. All possible alternatives would logically necessarily add a layer of computational motive and obfuscate the accuracy of outcomes. The question as to how a mathematical exercise has any other purpose than to make us do better is defined by why we use it in that way (internal private syntax). In the part of mathematics that takes into account motivation by cultural context (algorithms), only the text of the mathematics describing an object and its effects can be thought of as a pure, context-free language in that it singularly expresses the human desire to get things more right.
Not “right”. Right is an idea that does not exist absolutely (Heisenberg). It only exists relativistically to others, whereas “more right”, exists relative to itself and therefore, as a computational notion, can include internal syntax. The distinguishing idea of infinite computation to being “more right” on the other hand, implies that there is no end to accuracy, which we know is true, whereas “right” by its framing implies there is, which we know is not. Therefore, in more absolute terms the pursuit of “right” can be said to be an aimless one that can only fall foul of individual legal and personal rights. “More right” on the other hand doesn’t violate those rights, and while it may somewhat seem aimless at first and superficially, it is an algorithmic route to highly individualised and practically relevant applications. Relevant, individualised, safe, realtime healthcare prediction.
With this, I then end this essay asking the reader, can this be correct? And are there further implications perhaps missed here?
I look forward to reading your thoughts.
Stefaan
